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Are these coming philosophers new friends of “truth”? 
That is probable enough, for all philosophers so far have 
loved their truths.  But they will certainly not be dogmatists. 
Beyond Good and Evil, §43 
 
Introduction 
 Nietzsche’s philosophical endeavor can be broadly characterized by two 
complementary ambitions acting throughout his corpus: a relentless critique of traditional 
metaphysics, epistemology, and axiology; and an effort to confront the nihilistic 
predicament which seems to result from these negations.  Nowhere are these ideas more 
directly relevant and their implications more dramatic than in the discipline of philosophy 
itself; the task of the philosopher must be transformed by these revaluations of its tools 
and subject matter.    
Accordingly, Nietzsche’s writings ought to recommend a sort of thinker fitted to the 
pursuit of this task, but owing to his literary style there exists in his works no list of 
definite prescriptions for philosophical practice nor a simple portrait of such a 
philosopher.  The aim of this paper is to interpret Nietzsche’s writings and extract from 
them a coherent position on this question.2  I look mainly to his numerous and varied 
explorations of the pursuit of knowledge in order to seek out the considerations that shape 
his normative conception of the philosopher; these largely take the form of case studies of 
hypothetical truth-seekers.3  I do not intend to address Nietzsche’s practice as a 
philosopher himself, only his prescriptions – in general it cannot be assumed that he 
obeys his own recommendations.  It should also be noted that I attend to his descriptive 
claims only insofar as they relate to this topic, as this is a discussion of prescriptions and 
not ontology, psychology, etc., and that I limit myself to the published works.4
                                                 
1 I would like to thank all those who have provided their comments and suggestions over the course of this 
paper’s development: my fellow students Greg Taylor, Emily Ayoob, and David Boehnke, and my teachers 
Janet Folina and Henry West. 
2 It is not universally agreed upon that Nietzsche takes up any consistent positions of this kind.  Obviously 
it is my belief that he does, and I hope to clarify how this may be the case, but regardless my reading ought 
to give insight into a distinct and significant moment of his thought. 
3 Cf. the Socratic spirit (BT), the historian (ADH), the ‘rational’ and ‘intuitive’ man (TF), the philosopher 
of the future (BGE), the ascetic ideal (GM), and the late Nietzsche’s more comprehensive concept of the 
will to truth.   
[See bibliography for abbreviations of Nietzsche’s works.] 
4 I have chosen to exclude Nietzsche’s Nachlass (despite its treatment of some issues that concern me here) 
both because of the questionable status of taking such unpublished and incomplete notes as genuine 
philosophical positions on par with other sources and because of my greater familiarity with the published 
texts.  I make one exception to this, beginning my conclusion with a quotation which I simply could not 
pass up. 
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Nietzsche’s positive idea of philosophy (as opposed to his critique) retains the form of a 
search for ‘truth’ in some sense and consequently derives its unique character from a 
reinterpretation of that concept, rejecting the ‘dogmatic’ philosopher’s traditional articles 
of faith: the clear distinction between knowledge or truth and ‘mere opinion’ and the 
inherent value of this truth.  These denials frame two major features which can be 
attributed to the Nietzschean philosopher.   
 Firstly, from the denial of an absolute truth which is distinct from other types of 
belief, it follows that epistemic evaluation cannot proceed by way of comparison with 
some ideal and abstract point of view.  Nietzsche’s alternative is a brand of 
perspectivism, which underlies his normative determination of epistemic value.  
Secondly, because there is no necessary identity between the true and the good, beneficial 
truths must be distinguished from destructive ones, and such judgment necessarily 
imposes valuational, ethical limits on the domain of the philosopher.  These limits are 
defined by Nietzsche with recourse to a concept of ‘value for life’ ethically prior to truth; 
a truth, defined as such by its epistemic value, may still be condemned in this respect as 
destructive or antithetical to life.5  There are two complementary difficulties in this: to 
define what is meant by ‘life’ as a basis for value, and to see whether truth can survive 
this subordination at all without dissolving into relativism or nihilism.  The resolution of 
the tension in which epistemic value stands against value as defined by the criterion of 
life must be found in the meaning of Nietzsche’s ‘life’, ultimately understood in terms of 
the will to power. 
 
Epistemic Value 
It is helpful to first observe what the goal of the Nietzschean thinker is not: the 
transcendental, “pure ineffective truth” (TF p. 177)6 of the ‘Thing-in-itself’, ‘pure 
reason’, and ‘absolute spirituality’; Nietzsche dubs the absolute rationalism of much past 
inquiry “metaphysical illusion”.7  These concepts depend upon the “fiction that posited a 
‘pure, will-less, painless, timeless knowing subject’…in which the active and interpreting 
forces, through which alone seeing becomes seeing something, are supposed to be 
lacking,” and are therefore nonsense (GM III: 12).  This critique of abstract reflection is 
closely tied to perspectivist epistemology: “There is only a perspective seeing, only a 
perspective ‘knowing’” and “to eliminate the will altogether, to suspend each and every 
affect,” would mean “to castrate the intellect.”  Nietzsche thus takes up perspectivism, 
denying any possibility of justification sub specie æternitatis.8  
                                                 
5 This aspect can be seen in Nietzsche’s normative ambivalence in evaluations of the seeker for truth in 
many of his case studies (see note 3). 
6 I reference Nietzsche’s texts by section number and, if necessary, with an abbreviation of the work’s 
English title (elucidated in the bibliography).  “On Truth and Falsity in their Ultramoral Sense” and Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra are referenced by page numbers.  “P” indicates a preface.  All italics within quotations 
are Nietzsche’s or the translator’s. 
7 From the terms used in Nietzsche’s list, it seems that Kant and Hegel must be among his targets here.  The 
next quotation is aimed at Kant’s transcendental subject, cf. Critique of Pure Reason B 427. 
8 For discussion of Nietzsche’s perspectivism as a fundamental philosophical approach, cf. Richard 
Schacht’s “Nietzsche’s kind of philosophy,” esp. § III.  The Cambridge Companion to Nietzsche.  Ed. 
Bernd Magnus and Kathleen M. Higgins.  Cambridge U P, 1996, pp. 151-179.  This article puts forward an 
interpretation generally in agreement with my own. 
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The Nietzschean philosopher is not prohibited from abstract justifications, but an 
acceptable methodology cannot be the a priori ‘contemplation without interest’ which 
Nietzsche denounces.  He posits in its place a perspectival conception of objectivity 
understood “as the ability to control one’s Pro and Con…to employ a variety of 
perspectives and effective interpretations in the service of knowledge.”  Under such a 
theory, knowledge is constructed, not merely found; by creating antagonisms and 
amalgamations from varied systems of understanding the philosopher can assimilate ever 
more competing perspectives and thereby increase the scope of his truth.  It follows from 
this perspectivist view that “the more affects we allow to speak about one thing, the more 
complete will our ‘concept’ of this thing, our ‘objectivity,’ be” (GM III:12).1  Nietzsche’s 
notion of epistemic value is determined in proportion to comprehensiveness, understood 
as the inclusion of manifold subjective perspectives, and it is in this respect that the 
transcendental is rejected; a statement from no perspective can have no epistemic value.2
Knowledge acquired perspectivally cannot be regarded as self-evident in the way that 
‘pure reason’ might be – in Nietzsche’s view such self-evidence would be only empty 
circularity.  In order to ground truth in something external to itself Nietzsche asks that the 
philosopher “look at science in the perspective of the artist” – in other words, one must 
construct truth aesthetically (BT, P:2).  By this Nietzsche means that building up 
knowledge from subjective experience is fundamentally creative and active: perception 
takes place only through interpretation, an “aesthetical relation” between the “artistically 
creating subject” and his object (TF p. 184); the philosopher must participate in “the 
construction of ideas” and the “artistic formation of metaphors” (p. 187).  This conforms 
to the claim that objectivity is “a positive property” and cannot be “a pure passivity” 
which is merely acted upon by its objects and thereby accurately represents them in their 
“empirical essence” (ADH 6).  To seek knowledge is to express an “impulse to art” and 
“weave a whole out of the isolated: everywhere with the presupposition that a unity of 
plan must be put into things if it is not there...[replacing] the unintelligible with 
something intelligible” – inquiry as art serves as a means to tame the unknown.3   
 The profound result of Nietzsche’s condemnation of the metaphysical illusion 
implicit in transcendental knowledge and this unconventional notion of objectivity is that 
truth cannot be complete, nor is it independent of one’s perspectives.4  Even if 
subjectively honest – Nietzsche recognizes a certain artistic disinterestedness – one never 
divorces himself from perspectives and cannot hope to comprehend everything in his 
understanding; the universality and privileged position claimed by the “indifferent” 
                                                 
1 This perspectivism is borne out in the project of the Untimely Meditations, in which Nietzsche corrects for 
the “defect, infirmity and shortcoming of [his] age” not by retreating to a position outside history, shedding 
his German historical perspective in the name of transcendent objectivity, but rather by augmenting his 
view with the perspective of classical philology and ancient Greek civilization (ADH, P).  By using this to 
wage an “untimely” attack on the present he hopes to cure it, or better yet contribute to a “coming age” 
strengthened by the conflicts generated between the two perspectives. 
2 My division between transcendental and perspectival kinds of knowledge resembles that made by John T. 
Wilcox in his argument for the possibility of truth in Nietzsche.  Truth and Value in Nietzsche.  Ann Arbor: 
U Michigan P, 1974.  pp.  155-170. 
3 It is in this sense that in The Birth of Tragedy we are told that the recalcitrant boundaries of scientific 
inquiry constitute “limits at which it must turn into art” (15). 
4 Empirical knowledge, particularly knowledge of human affairs (e.g. history), is always limited in this 
way, but in at least one instance Nietzsche makes an exception for “a pure science like, say, mathematics” 
which is not subordinated to life (ADH 1). 
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metaphysician is unobtainable (ADH 6).  Because of this, no essential difference in kind 
can be established to distinguish objectivity from even the most limited subjectivity, but 
only a difference of degree.  By this stroke Nietzsche seeks to abolish the boundary 
between knowledge and ‘mere opinion’ upheld by dogmatic philosophers.5   
 It does not follow from this, however, that one cannot value the greater objectivity 
of justifications employing manifold perspectives.  Ostensibly, increased 
comprehensiveness will resolve contradictions between less objective perspectives and 
guard against future contradiction, though it can never preclude it with certainty.  Despite 
its limitations, Nietzsche certainly does find his type of objectivity to be philosophically 
valuable and considers it an epistemologically legitimate method for interpreting the 
world. 
 
The Value of Truth for Life 
Truths are not valuable, however, in themselves: “‘Knowledge for its own 
sake’…is the last snare of morality…”, and to Nietzsche morality is anathema (BGE 64).  
To maintain inquiry as a good in itself is condemned as dogmatic and moralistic in that it 
implies an abstract realm (Hinterwelt) other than that of experience and then values it 
unconditionally and absolutely.6  To maintain “a metaphysical faith” in the inherent value 
of truth is to “thereby affirm another world than that of life, nature, and history” (GS 
344).  Nietzsche considers this an unacceptably pessimistic position which conceals “a 
hatred of the ‘world’…a transcendence rigged up to slander mortal existence, a yearning 
for extinction…the most dangerous, most sinister form the will to destruction can take” 
(BT 11).  He therefore warns against regarding the ‘unselfing’ that takes place in the 
approach to objectivity “as if it were the goal itself and redemption and transfiguration”; 
objectivity may be an instrument, but not a purpose (BGE 207).  To mistake truth for an 
end in itself reduces philosophy to ‘theory of knowledge’, which in Nietzsche’s view 
weakens it and denies it access to meaning; no profundity survives this error (BGE 204).   
It is not the aesthetic nature of perspectival truth, either, which grants knowledge its 
value.  Nietzsche encourages the philosopher not only to “to look at science in the 
perspective of the artist, but at art in that of life” (BT, P:2).  ‘Life’ emerges as the purpose 
for the sake of which truths are constructed and the criterion for judging their value: 
 
Now, is life to rule over knowledge, over science, or is knowledge to rule over life?  … No one 
will doubt: life is the higher, the ruling authority...  Knowledge presupposes life and so has the 
same interest in the preservation of life which every being has in its own continuing existence.  
Thus science requires a higher supervision and guarding:  a hygiene of life is placed close beside 
science… (ADH 10) 
 
This means that, as has already been suggested, epistemic value does not imply value 
proper, value for life.  Nietzsche takes a formula from Goethe: “instruction which fails to 
quicken activity [and] knowledge which enfeebles activity” ought to be “seriously hated” 
by the philosopher (ADH, P).  This is illustrated in “On Truth and Falsity in their 
Ultramoral Sense”, wherein Nietzsche depicts two radically different types of truth: the 
                                                 
5 This critique has at least one particular dogmatist in mind; Nietzsche here rejoins the line divided by 
Plato, cf. Republic 509 d 6 - 511 e 5. 
6 Once again, the paradigm of transcendental knowledge here is Plato, and this critique aimed at his world 
of Forms. 
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objectivity of the ‘rational man’ and the subjective caprice of the ‘intuitive man’, but 
“both desire to rule over life” and are held to its standard (p. 190).  The rational man 
“designates only the relations of things to men” (p. 178), while the intellect of the 
intuitive man “is free and dismissed from his [sic] service as slave, so long as It [sic] is 
able to deceive without injuring” (p. 189); reason is of restricted scope while creative 
truth, when it deceives, must do so as fiction rather than a harmful lie.  This is an appeal 
to life which defines the proper boundaries of inquiry, as both kinds of knowledge are 
limited to that domain in which they are helpful to human life.  If these boundaries are 
transgressed, then truth takes on a destructive character and lacks value for life.  
Nietzsche emphasizes the importance of such a limit: “Cheerfulness, clear conscience, 
the carefree deed, faith in the future, all this depends… on there being a line which 
distinguishes what is clear and in full view from the dark and unilluminable”; “this is a 
general law: every living thing can become healthy, strong and fruitful only within a 
horizon…” (ADH 1). 
If this is the case then the philosopher may face an “opposition between life and wisdom” 
wherein some truths are inimical to life and are therefore to be avoided (ADH 1).  Thus 
the classical notion of an identity between the true and the good is destroyed: the 
philosopher of the future “will have little faith that truth of all things should be 
accompanied by…amusements for our feelings” (BGE 210).  Truth can be a 
‘hypertrophic virtue’, just as in history “there is a degree of insomnia, of rumination, of 
historical sense which injures every living thing and finally destroys it” (ADH, P; 1).  An 
excess of truth, or a truth not fitted to the needs of its particular situation, might inspire 
pessimism or paralysis and thereby prevent action, as it does in the ‘superhistorical man’ 
– the philosopher must avoid that truth which would undermine his ability to act or 
destroy him. 
This discussion of truth as hypertrophic and overgrown does not suggest that it has in any 
way ceased to be truth, i.e. lost its epistemic justification.  It would be a mistake, then, to 
interpret Nietzsche as founding his concept of truth in usefulness or life-enhancement and 
collapsing epistemological and life-enhancing normativity; although life is presented as 
the ultimate value in these considerations, it is not the only one.  There are two distinct 
types of value at play which sometimes conflict: that of truth, founded in perspectivism, 
and that of life.  Even granting this distinction, the primacy of life in this opposition of 
values creates a worrying status for truth: what is the function of epistemic value if in 
every determination it is to be subordinated to another value?  I shall return to this worry 
after a discussion of how the philosopher may defend himself from unhabitable truths. 
 
Solace and Protection 
One has recourse to helpful fantasies in order to escape such unlivable truths.  Religion is 
one such consolation, but there are others which strike closer to the philosopher’s 
concerns.  In The Birth of Tragedy the ‘theoretical man’,7 who believes in the lie of 
transcendental knowledge, “like the artist…finds an infinite delight in whatever exists, 
and this satisfaction protects him against the practical ethics of pessimism” (15).  Even 
the ascetic ideal of suffering and otherworldliness serves as a “‘faute de mieux’ 8 par 
excellence” in which “the door [is] closed to any kind of suicidal nihilism” by affirming 
                                                 
7 ‘Theoretical man’ is also called the ‘optimist’ and identified with Socrates. 
8 “stopgap”; used for “lack of anything better” 
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the philosopher’s existence at the cost of the world: “pereat mundus, fiat philosophia, fiat 
philosophus, fiam!”9 (GM III:28,7).  Although these dogmas are lies, and pessimistic 
ones at that, there is “metaphysical comfort” (BT P:7) provided by the transcendent other 
worlds they posit, and hence they may in practice preserve life. 
There is also a possibility of beneficial deceptions and omissions within the domain of 
truth itself; knowledge is, in the perspectivist view, an artifice which is always somewhat 
contingent even when it is honest.  Nietzsche invites us to “rejoice in our unwisdom”, 
even to embrace our prejudices “as long as, within these prejudices, we make progress 
and do not stand still!” (ADH 1).  The ‘truths’ of the rational and intuitive man find their 
very basis in dissimulation, but these illusions are justified as “a means for the 
preservation of the individual” and each is suited to different circumstances (TF pp. 174, 
190-2).  Similarly, On the Advantage and Disadvantage of History for Life puts forward 
three distinct modes of historical inquiry, each of which is considered epistemologically 
valid but necessarily distorts its object to a particular end and is only appropriate within 
certain lived contexts – if misused, “it grows into a noxious weed” which can cause harm 
to life (2).   
The imperative for the philosopher is to justify his perspectival truths in terms of life-
enhancement, making his methodology contingent upon his specific circumstances, and 
this can be seen in Nietzsche’s discussions of critical inquiry.  Nietzsche calls his 
philosophers of the future “attempters”, “and certainly they would be men of 
experiments” (BGE 42, 210).  They could be called skeptics, but “this would still 
designate only one feature and not them as a whole”; they could be called critics, but this 
too would describe only part of their task, for “critics are instruments of the philosopher 
and for that reason, being instruments, a long way from being philosophers themselves” 
(BGE 210).  Dangerous knowledge often comes in the form of rejecting truths one has up 
to now accepted.  Like the critical historian, the philosopher “must have the strength, and 
use it from time to time, to shatter and dissolve something to enable him to live,” but if 
this tendency dominates it “uproots the future because it destroys illusions and robs 
existing things of their atmosphere in which alone they can live…its judging is always 
annihilating” (ADH 3, 7).  In order to justify himself, then, the philosopher must be 
motivated by a “constructive drive” and destroy only in the name of some greater 
creation.  The same principle holds for any method: the philosopher should not seek truth 
to a degree that is injurious nor transgress beyond his capacities.  “It is not justice which 
here sits in judgment…but life alone, that dark, driving, insatiably self-desiring power” 
(ADH 3). 
Life as a value has thus far not been adequately discussed; apart from the negative 
assessments of pessimism and criticism it is unclear how this value is to be applied.  
Under a purely practical or cynical understanding of the concept ‘life’10 it seems that the 
methods above allow one to choose the most convenient truths, and since helpful 
deceptions and even protective falsehoods may be allowed as well, the worry is all the 
more acute.  The philosopher would need not fear overstepping his abilities nor face any 
difficult truths if he were to simply select the beliefs fitted to his desired life and regard 
this as ultimate justification.  Value for life trumps truth, so he would need not concern 
himself with the consistency or accuracy of his views nor even maintaining them over 
                                                 
9 “Let the world perish, but let there be philosophy, the philosopher, me! ” 
10 e.g. a reading of Nietzsche as hedonist or pragmatist  
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time; he could simply find the best solace for every pain and persist in pleasant delusion.  
This is manifestly nihilistic: truth has simply disappeared, absorbed into its axiological 
foundations in life, and the epistemic value discussed above can count for nothing.  One 
suspects that there has been a misreading of life in this interpretation, and this suspicion 
is confirmed by Nietzsche, who recognizes such a case:  
 
If, in any sense, it is some happiness or pursuit of happiness which binds the living being to life 
and urges him to live, then perhaps no philosopher is closer to the truth than the cynic: for the 
happiness of the animal, that thorough cynic, is living proof of the truth of cynicism (ADH 1) 
 
If happiness were the goal, then Nietzsche here suggests that the best strategy would be to 
forget everything and live as a beast unconscious of truth and lie altogether.  It should 
also be seen that life as discussed so far has been couched in terms not of pleasure or 
convenience but of action and motion – the position of the cynic evokes tranquil 
satisfaction or mere survival, not flourishing and dynamism, and clearly this is not what 
Nietzsche has in mind when he writes of life and philosophy.   
 
Enter the Will to Power 
“Only where life is, there is also will: not will to life, but…will to power!” (Z p. 
138).  This is of utmost importance to the understanding of Nietzsche’s criterion of value: 
to serve life is not to follow a ‘will to life’ (“He who shot the doctrine of ‘will to 
existence’ at truth certainly did not hit the truth: this will - does not exist!”) but rather the 
will of life, which is the will to power.  It is this which prevents the Nietzschean 
philosopher from falling into the cynic’s position.  The will to power is described as a 
“‘procreating life-will’…[that] when it commands, faces ‘risk and danger’”; the will to 
power invokes a joy in opposition, domination and show of strength.  Nietzsche makes 
broad cosmological claims about this idea, suggesting an infinite number of expressions 
of the will to power, most of which are irrelevant to this discussion; for the philosopher, 
the “will to power walks with the feet of [the] will to truth” (Z p. 137-8).   This “impulse 
towards a goal, towards the higher, more distant, more manifold,” when oriented toward 
truth, is the constructive drive needed to justify the task of philosopher.11
Truth gives the thinker mastery over the object of his thought, and as an artistic project 
satisfies a definition of life proffered in Beyond Good and Evil: “life itself is essentially 
appropriation…overpowering of what is alien…imposition of one’s own forms, 
incorporation…” (259).  Thus from life itself Nietzsche derives a desire for truth strong 
enough to cause the philosopher to risk even life itself in order to test the limits of his 
nature, preserving the role of epistemic value as a challenge.  Life is not quite valued in 
itself; without the opposition of truth, life would lack value for the philosopher, for it 
would have no stimulus or object for action.  Under this interpretation, then, 
epistemological value and value for life are placed in a delicately balanced 
complementarity. 
The boundary of inquiry for a philosopher, the degree to which he can survive his 
objectivity, is determined by his “plastic power”, the strength of his aesthetic faculty for 
                                                 
11 This is much like the conclusion reached by Simon May in his case study of Nietzsche’s revaluation of 
truth: “The general end which conditions the value of truth in Nietzsche’s ethic is clearly ‘life-
enhancement’ – i.e. the maximization of power, sublimation and ‘form creation’…”  Nietzsche’s Ethics and 
his War on ‘Morality’.  Oxford U P, 1999.  p. 175. 
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“transforming and assimilating” – the greater this power, the more truth he will be able to 
absorb and bear without being overwhelmed (ADH 1).  Put in terms of historical truth: 
 
The stronger the roots of the inmost nature of a man are, the more of the past will he appropriate 
or master; and were one to conceive the most powerful and colossal nature, it would be known by 
this, that for it there would be no limit at which the historical sense could overgrow and harm it; 
such a nature would draw its own as well as every other alien past wholly into itself and transform 
it into blood, as it were. (ADH 1) 
 
The will to truth, then, which cannot be understood through ‘advantage for life’ alone, is 
comprehended in the will to power, which gives Nietzsche his “real measure of value”: 
“How much truth does a spirit endure, how much truth does it dare?” (EH, P:3).   
 
Further Problems 
This account of the pursuit of knowledge insists that “the genuine 
philosopher…lives ‘unphilosophically’ and ‘unwisely,’ above all imprudently, and feels 
the burden and the duty of a hundred attempts and temptations of life – he risks himself 
constantly” (BGE 205).  It does not seem a theoretically implausible system of values to 
have truth increase in life-value as it approaches the boundary of its destructive aspect, 
but it may be practically implausible; to be daring and imprudent seems a difficult 
prescription to follow, especially if Nietzsche’s dramatic rhetoric about the negative 
consequences of inquiry’s misuse (e.g. annihilation, pessimism, etc.) is to be taken 
seriously.  Nietzsche’s later tendency to promote unconditional truth and a philosopher 
who need “never ask if the truth is useful or if it may prove [his] undoing” (A, P), taken 
as a maxim, seems to demand that one be sacrificed before a new dogma of truth and thus 
to drive Nietzsche into hopeless pessimism.  If Nietzsche is consistent on this point, this 
must be interpreted as an ideal which orients the drive to increase one’s subjective 
honesty, perspectival objectivity, and capacity for truth; as a straightforward description 
it is more applicable to Nietzsche’s ideal types, e.g. the Übermensch and the philosophers 
of the future, than to any of the ‘human, all too human’ philosophers who have come ‘so 
far’. 
The paradox from which these concerns emanate is one innate to the will to power, a 
concept that basically proclaims danger, risk, and immoderation to be goods in 
themselves.  I cannot attempt a real critique of this central Nietzschean notion here, but a 
word should be said about the epistemological and axiological status of the will to power 
and the other positions here attributed to Nietzsche.  The interpretation presented here has 
the benefit of avoiding any extreme sort of skepticism, which when stated as a positive 
claim cannot be defended coherently.  The epistemology of perspectivism can account for 
itself: it is a theoretical perspective, and is justified as truth insofar as it itself is 
comprehensive (relative to other available perspectives).  The will to power, in its 
descriptive dimension at least, must similarly be seen as a candidate for this sort of 
evaluation.12
                                                 
12 Peter Heller, who finds in Nietzsche a unity similar to that presented here, interprets the will to power as 
being “presumed to have the greatest vital scope” as a truth-assertion.  “Multiplicity and Unity in 
Nietzsche's Works and Thoughts on Thought.”  The German Quarterly, Vol. 52, No. 3. (May, 1979), pp. 
319-338; p. 333. 
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 The justification behind life as a value and the will to power in its normative 
aspect is to be found in Nietzsche’s naturalism – he seeks to affirm the instincts, whereas 
the ascetic ideal makes evils of them.  As should be clear from the discussion above, 
though, Nietzsche does not admit of an interpretation that places the criterion of life and 
the nature of power in the service of some regress to a state of nature (presumably as 
biological survival and brute domination, respectively), and Nietzsche directly rejects this 
sort of naturalism: the ‘return to nature’ “is really not a going back but an ascent…” (TI 
IX:48).   
In reading this naturalistic reversal of ascetism, then, one must not forget the positive 
aspects of that dogma; belief in a transcendental truth turns the ascetic against his 
instincts, but thereby his “entire inner world…expanded and extended itself, acquired 
depth, breadth, depth, and height” – he becomes more comprehensive and powerful, 
differentiating himself from unconscious animals, and wards off (personal) pessimism 
with his illusion.  Nietzsche’s project is not a turning back but a turning against the 
ascetic – Nietzsche’s philosopher is an anti-ascetic, one who regains his instincts not with 
bestial immediacy but through his denial of the transcendental.  Nietzsche employs the 
complexity engendered by asceticism against it, seeking to “wed bad conscience to all the 
unnatural inclinations…which are one and all hostile to life…” (GM 24).  In the terms of 
the interpretation presented here, this objective is a constructive act of the will to power 
which seeks to bring the thinker to a new level of depth and objectivity.  It is only in his 
acceptance of instinct that Nietzsche’s philosopher resembles an animal; in the scope of 
his understanding and the very movement by which he achieves it, a reversal of previous 
doctrine by bad conscience, he can be seen as the ascetic overcome and taken one step 
further. 13  As with his claims about truth, Nietzsche’s naturalism is applicable to itself; it 
is not intended as an absolute account but rather as a ‘truth-in-need’ expressing life’s will 
to power with a new level of comprehensiveness. 
 
Conclusion 
 In the Nachlass, Nietzsche describes his task: “to show how life, philosophy, and 
art can have a deeper and familial relationship to each other, without philosophy 
becoming shallow and the life of the philosopher becoming untruthful” (KSA VIII: 104).  
From a unique theory of truth which denies transcendental justification and opposes the 
value for life to the value of truth Nietzsche produces some guidelines for philosophy: a 
perspectivist, aesthetic account of epistemology and objectivity and the limits within 
which truth is valuable in terms of life.  The fundamental concept of ‘life’, if properly 
understood, must imply the will to power and hence underlie and depend upon the 
philosopher’s will to truth.  This meshes well with the artistic, interpretive nature of truth, 
which is a way of appropriating subjective experience and putting it to use, and the 
                                                 
13 Nietzsche here places himself firmly within the tradition of the ascetic and does not condemn him in any 
universal sense.  This counters Conway’s critique of Nietzsche’s naturalism, which claims that he fails to 
consider himself in the naturalistic terms he uses against previous philosophers.  “Returning to Nature: 
Nietzsche’s Götterdämmerung.”  Nietzsche: A Critical Reader.  Ed. Peter R. Sedgwick.  Cambridge: 
Blackwell, 1995.  pp. 31-52. 
My interpretation of Nietzsche’s naturalism is shared by Wayne Klein, who similarly finds a reading of 
life and related concepts as contingent and “strategic rather than ontological” necessary in order to 
“reconcile his critique of truth and morality.”   Nietzsche and the Promise of Philosophy.  Albany: State U 
of New York P, 1997.  p. 179. 
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approach toward objectivity through the incorporation of more perspectives is analogous 
to the injunction to take on all the truth that one can bear.  Nietzsche defines life in such a 
way that it serves as the driving force underlying the will to truth as well as the measure 
and limit of its value.  If risk is the good of the philosopher, then he needs nothing more 
than the wisdom to make his wagers and attempts; his greatest virtues will be his honesty, 
his courage for daring, and his adherence to the imperative “Know thyself!”, for his 
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